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AN ESSAY ON THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN TEXAS:
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the publication of this Essay.
During the short period of time that marked the completion of this Essay and its
publication, we in the law school community endured the tragic loss of our friend,
student, and fellow classmate, Eric Riester. Eric exemplified all that is good of the non-
traditional student: slightly older, hard working, athletic, intelligent, friendly and most
of all, he showed great promise. We can only wonder as to what he would have
accomplished had he been given more time. For example, we know he had accepted
three of the four clerkships offered to him this summer and was looking forward to
establishing himself in the legal profession.
To those he leaves behind-his wife, daughter, sister, and mother-we can only say
that we know not why God chose to take him so soon. And while we do not question
His judgment, we do express our appreciation for the opportunity of sharing a small part
of his too short life. To paraphrase the poet Gibran when speaking of the traveler about
to embark on a journey: there is a staying in his going and a going in his staying. We
know that part of Eric will stay with us forever, and only hope that he has taken part of
us with him. On this his final voyage, we say: God speed! And to Eric, God bless!
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I. INTRODUCTION
The injury of emotional distress is an interesting tort, which has
long perplexed the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence.
Originally, allegations of this kind did not constitute a cause of ac-
tion. The courts routinely dismissed plaintiffs' lawsuits, reasoning
that such claims were too speculative in that they were extremely
difficult to prove. The judiciary's goal was to stem what it most
feared: false claims resulting in a flood of litigation.' An interest-
ing phenomenon occurred, however, when the medical profession
developed the capacity to establish beyond doubt that the injury
was real.' When this occurred, the law was quick to change. It was
as if the legal profession followed in the tremendous progress made
in the field of medicine, and as a result, the rules governing recov-
ery evolved during the last century. Today, there is no question
that an injured plaintiff may recover for the infliction of emotional
distress. The majority and minority positions differ only on what
must be alleged and proved.
1. See City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tex. 1997) (stating that fear of the
false claim previously led courts to award damages for mental anguish only when objective
bodily symptoms were present); Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex. 1995)
(noting that historically, mental anguish claims were distrusted, and courts did not award
damages); Bassham v. Evans, 216 S.W. 446, 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, no writ)
(holding that mental anguish damages are not recoverable because suffering is not seen by
the courts as resulting from an act, but rather as a remote contingency).
2. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1987) (stating that
"medical research has provided modern mankind with a much more detailed and useful
understanding of the interaction between mind and body"); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d
758, 766-67 (Haw. 1974) (noting that a psychiatrist cannot necessarily establish negligence
as the only cause of mental injury, but he or she can give an estimate of the likely impact of
the defendant's actions on the plaintiff, and whether the trauma caused the mental
anguish); Nicholas M. Whittington, Note, Against the Grain: An Interdisciplinary Exami-
nation of the 1996 Federal Statutory Changes to the Taxability of Personal Injury Awards, 37
WASHBURN L.J. 153, 185 (1997) (arguing that emotional distress is real, and does not re-
quire any objective physical manifestation).
3. Compare Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex. 1993) (adopting the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the elements of which are: "1) the de-
fendant acted intentionally or recklessly, 2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, 3)
the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional distress, and 4) the emotional
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In fact, mental anguish is one of the few torts wherein the basis
of liability may be either the intentional behavior of the defendant,
or in the alternative, the negligent conduct of the defendant. This
Essay-as noted in the title-is concerned only with the latter.
The Texas Supreme Court in Twyman v. Twyman 4 made it quite
clear that Texas was joining the majority of jurisdictions in recog-
nizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 As
an interesting footnote to the history of our common law, the court
in its decision did not mention Duty v. General Finance Co., 6 which
recognized the tort in 1954.7 Nevertheless, Twyman is the defini-
tive case on intentional infliction of emotional distress in Texas.8
II. DEFINITION
Before proceeding, the term mental anguish should be defined.
This is an endeavor that has perplexed the judiciary. 9 The courts
distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe"), and id. at 622 (distinguishing the "rigorous
legal standards of the Restatement formulation of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress," with that of negligent infliction of emotional distress), with Boyles v. Kerr, 855
S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex. 1993) (citing Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, as holding that conclusive
proof of physical injury as a result of mental anguish is not required to sustain an action at
common law for negligent infliction of emotional distress), and Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 595
(stating that Garrard stood for the proposition that only severe emotional distress is action-
able, and that jurors are the best mechanism of ascertaining whether the defendant's ac-
tions are actionable).
4. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
5. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex. 1993) (holding that Texas was
"the forty-seventh state to adopt the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress").
6. 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
7. See Duty v. Gen. Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 20, 273 S.W.2d 64, 66 (1954). The court
stated:
[B]ut we do hold that resort to every cruel device which his cunning can invent in
order to enforce collection when that course of conduct has the intended effect of
causing great mental anguish to the debtor, resulting in physical injury and causing his
loss of employment, renders the creditor liable to respond in damages.
Id.
8. See Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1993) (stating that the court
recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress in Twyman, and adopted the ele-
ments of the tort as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)); Mot-
senbocker v. Potts, 863 S.W.2d 126, 131 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ) (noting the
Texas Supreme Court formally recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress in
Twyman).
9. See Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d at 444 (opining that the definition of mental anguish
proffered in Trevino v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) requires a jury to make difficult distinctions and gives rise to
situations when courts and juries find the current definition troublesome in application).
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seem to have a very difficult time determining what interest this
tort is supposed to protect. The most widely used definition is one
wherein we speak, not in terms of what the cause of action is in-
tended to encompass, but more in terms of what the injury is not.
For example:
The term 'mental anguish' implies a relatively high degree of mental
pain and distress. It is more than mere disappointment, anger, re-
sentment, or embarrassment, although it may include all of these. It
includes a mental sensation of pain resulting from such painful emo-
tions as grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride,
shame, despair and/or public humiliation. 10
Instead of this approach, the following is offered. Why not take
cognizance of the fact that, as a tort, we are dealing with a physical
injury? After all, a tort is defined as an injury to the property or
person of another. Mental anguish, however, is not a physical in-
jury in the normal sense of the term because it is not an injury to
the body of the plaintiff. Instead, it is one limited to the mind. 1
Mental anguish is an injury to the mind that precludes the individ-
ual from performing those tasks of daily life-such as eating, sleep-
ing, working, concentrating-which up to the time of the alleged
mishap, they could perform with ease. This proposed definition
should incorporate the fact that the plaintiff is dealing with a high
degree of mental pain and distress, and would also acknowledge
that the plaintiff suffers more than mere disappointment, anger, re-
sentment, or embarrassment. Mental anguish would also result
from painful emotions such "as grief, severe disappointment, indig-
nation, wounded pride, shame, despair and/or public humilia-
tion.' 1 2 More importantly, establishing mental anguish should
require the plaintiff to furnish the proof that has always been
sought by the courts to prevent the onslaught of the false claim.
10. Trevino v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
11. See Larrumbide v. Doctors Health Facilities, 734 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, writ denied) (defining mental anguish as "a heightened emotional injury be-
yond ordinary grief; it encompasses keen and poignant mental suffering, a high degree of
mental suffering, or an intense pain of mind or body"); Roberts v. U.S. Home Corp., 694
S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ) (noting that the term "mental
anguish" implies a significant degree of mental and emotional pain (quoting Trevino, 582
S.W.2d at 584)).
12. Trevino, 582 S.W.2d at 584.
[Vol. 33:455
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Finally, this definition speaks not in terms of what the injury does
not include, but more in terms of what it encompasses. By empha-
sizing this standard, the courts and their juries have a more objec-
tive and easier rule to apply.
III. BACKGROUND
Historically, it should be noted that Texas was the first jurisdic-
tion in the United States to allow recovery for mental anguish. In
1890, the Texas Supreme Court, in a drastic departure from the
prevailing rule of that time, allowed an injured plaintiff compensa-
tion.13 Texas continued to keep abreast of the national trend until
1993. In that year, the Texas Supreme Court appeared to take a
position contrary to the majority view. In Boyles v. Kerr,4 the
court decided that negligent infliction of emotional distress alone
was not compensable.1 5 As a result, some practitioners, and indeed
some courts, state that the tort is no longer recognized.' 6 This is in
13. See Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 215, 13 S.W. 59, 59 (1890). The court recognized
for the first time an award for mental anguish, stating:
We have found no exact precedent for such an action, but that is no sufficient reason
why an action should not be sustained. That a physical personal injury may be pro-
duced through a strong emotion of the mind there can be no doubt. The fact that it is
more difficult to produce such an injury through the operation of the mind than by
direct physical means affords no sufficient ground for refusing compensation, in an
action at law, when the injury is intentionally or negligently inflicted. It may be more
difficult to prove the connection between the alleged cause and the injury, but if it be
proved, and the injury be the proximate result of the cause, we cannot say that a
recovery should not be had.
Id.
14. 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
15. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. 1993) (stating "[b]y overruling the
language of Garrard, we hold only that there is no general duty not to negligently inflict
emotional distress"). The court added that "[o]ur decision does not affect a claimant's
right to recover mental anguish damages caused by defendant's breach of some other legal
duty." Id.
16. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) (noting that in Boyles,
decided on the same day as Twyman, the court decided a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress does not exist in Texas); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d
512, 513 (Tex. 1993) (citing Boyles for the proposition that Texas has no cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress); Burnap v. Linnartz, 38 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (noting that appellant conceded summary judgment was
correctly granted for the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because Texas does
not recognize such a cause of action); Rios v. Tex. Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d
809, 816 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (stating "[a]ppellant alleged negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress arising from [appellee's] ... breach of an employment
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:455




In the area of actionable negligence, the early cases allowed re-
covery only in instances where there had been some pre-existing
physical injury. 17 In an attempt to stall the aforementioned ava-
lanche of false claims, the courts insisted on a safety measure. This
was accomplished by requiring the injured plaintiff to show that
the alleged mental anguish resulted from an actual injury to their
body.18 This rule served as a safety net for the courts, and satisfied
the concern that the alleged mental injury was real. Thus, develop-
contract"). The court stated that "Texas does not recognize a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress." Rios, 930 S.W.2d at 816; Noriega v. Mireles, 925 S.W.2d
261, 268 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (stating that in addition to not
recognizing a claim for lost chance of survival, Texas also does not recognize negligent
infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action due to the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Boyles); Hector v. Thaler, 927 S.W.2d 95, 97 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1996, writ denied) (noting that appellees moved for summary judgment, in part, on the
grounds that negligent infliction of emotional distress is not recognized in Texas); Barker v.
City of Galveston, 907 S.W.2d 879, 889 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)
(stating that summary judgment was proper in a cause of action where plaintiffs conceded
that negligent infliction of emotional distress does not exist as a tort in Texas); Farrington
v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 254 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ
denied) (stating "the Texas Supreme Court eliminated negligent infliction of emotional
distress as a cause of action"); Wackenhut Corp. v. Perez, 865 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (relating that although the jury found the defendant
negligent and awarded money damages, the court of appeals reversed because Texas does
not recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress).
17. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. 1987) (citing Hill, 76
Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59, for the proposition that while mental anguish was first recognized
under conventional tort concepts, recovery was not allowed where the plaintiff's distress
failed to manifest itself physically); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Garrett, 161 So. 753, 755 (Miss. 1935)
(noting courts recognize that emotional distress may produce a physical injury).
18. See R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995) (asserting the
proposition that "the impact rule requires that 'before a plaintiff can recover damages for
emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered
must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact"') (quoting Reynolds
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), review
denied, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1993)); Connell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 22 S.W. 345, 349 (1893)
(justifying a claim for mental anguish because the body and mind are so inter-connected
that a bodily injury can result in an injury to the mind).
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ing the so-called "impact rule."'19 As long as the allegations
stemmed from a pre-existing injury or contact to the plaintiff's
body, the courts were willing to offer compensation for the result-
ing mental anguish. The standard was in effect for many years, and
appeared to be an effective compromise. Injured plaintiffs were
allowed to recover, while providing a restrictive measure preclud-
ing false claims.
Interestingly, three exceptions to this rule soon evolved. The
first dealt with the negligent mis-handling of dead bodies;20 the sec-
ond covered negligently delayed messages concerning death;21 and
the third involved what soon became known as cases wherein the
plaintiff was not injured but was deemed to be within the "zone of
danger. "22
The first two exceptions are easy to accept. Obviously, the early
common law was entranced with the aura that surrounds the death
of a loved one. If their body is mis-handled (and there are some
grotesque cases involving this type of scenario),23 the courts could
19. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 547 (1994) (stating that the im-
pact rule allows damages for mental anguish only when there has been a physical impact to
the plaintiff's body resulting from the conduct of the defendant); Parkway Co. v. Woodruff,
901 S.W.2d 434, 442-43 (Tex. 1995) (tracing the history of the impact rule in Texas).
20. Clark v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 192, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(finding that an award of $6,000 to the children of deceased was not excessive when testi-
mony showed the victims to be emotionally distressed and revolted by the appearance of
the body, even though there was no evidence of permanent physical or emotional damage);
Pat H. Foley & Co. v. Wyatt, 442 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that when a funeral home contracts to prepare the body of a deceased
loved one, they contract to do so in a workmanlike manner and know that the family of
the deceased will likely suffer emotional distress if they fail).
21. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Junker, 153 S.W.2d 210, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m) (addressing an appeal from the District Court of Cameron
County which awarded plaintiff $500 in damages for delay in delivery of an "unrepeated"
telegram, which subsequently caused plaintiff to miss her mother's funeral); Stuart v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 584-85, 18 S.W. 351, 353 (1885) (noting that in a claim for
emotional distress, the person negligently handling a message knows that withholding such
a message concerning a mortal illness inflicts an injury to the mind).
22. See Houston Elec. Co. v. Dorsett, 194 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1946) (stating the case
at bar did not concern an action regarding only fright, unaccompanied by bodily injury, and
showing that the plaintiff was outside of the zone of danger).
23. See Lions Eye Bank v. Perry, 56 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (relating that deceased's eyes were harvested for organ donation with-
out the consent of next of kin); Heikkila v. Harris County, 973 S.W.2d 333, 334-35 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1998, pet. denied) (discussing a case in which the misidentification of a
mother's deceased child resulted in the subsequent release of the child's body to the wrong
mother).
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easily accept the concept of resulting mental anguish. The same
could be said of the second exception. When one misses the burial
and attending ceremony of a loved one, there is little doubt that
emotional distress results.24 In both of these instances, the courts
were satisfied that the allegations concerning mental anguish were
real. This was also true in suits involving the so-called "zone of
danger." Although there was no required pre-existing injury as
noted above, the plaintiff was apparently so close to being injured
that the courts were again satisfied as to the legitimacy of their
claim.25
When Texas abandoned the impact rule, the position involving
this last scenario also changed. California led the way in Dillon v.
Legg,26 holding that the plaintiff could recover for their alleged
mental anguish for injury inflicted upon a third person only when
such emotional distress was foreseeable. 27 It was deemed foresee-
able if three criteria were established:
(1) Whether [the] plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon [the] plain-
tiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the acci-
dent, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its
occurrence. (3) Whether [the] plaintiff and the victim were closely
24. See Loper v. W. Union Tel. Co., 70 Tex. 689, 691-92, 8 S.W. 600, 601-02 (1888)
(discussing a case in which parents of deceased child failed to get his urgent message con-
cerning his rapidly failing health and were not present for his death or burial); W. Union
Tel. Co. v. McGaughey, 198 S.W. 1084, 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1917, writ ref'd)
(relating a case in which a negligently handled telegram caused a mother to be unable to
view her son's remains and attend his funeral).
25. See Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Tex. 1980) (stating that in a case
where parents of the deceased sought damages for mental anguish, petitioners argued that
there was no evidence that respondents merited damages for mental anguish because par-
ents were not located in the zone of danger); Sanchez v. Schindler, 626 S.W.2d 871, 874
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ granted) (stating that the court was sympathetic to a
more liberal test, but could not apply one in the case because the plaintiff was not present
at the scene and did not observe the event), rev'd in part, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
26. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
27. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919-21 (Cal. 1968).
Under general principles recovery should be had in such a case if defendant should
foresee fright or shock severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person normally
constituted .... Since the chief element in determining whether defendant owes a
duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of
prime concern in every case.
Id. at 920.
2002] NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 463
related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship."
The impact rule and its three exceptions operated in an efficient
and satisfactory manner. All was well. The medical profession,
however, advanced yet again, and was able to establish beyond
doubt that it was possible to sustain mental anguish even in cases
where no pre-existing physical injury existed. 9
B. Physical Manifestations
The evolved position no longer required a pre-existing impact to
the body of the plaintiff. However, the legal profession, still fearful
of false claims, was adamant about requiring a safety measure.3 °
The legal profession insisted that injured plaintiffs establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged mental anguish was
real. The solution soon became apparent. The law required plain-
tiffs to exhibit physical proof of the alleged emotional distress.31
To do so, the plaintiffs showed that their bodies were outwardly
manifesting the mental pain they were enduring. This was accom-
plished by evidence which included, but was not limited to, the fact
that a plaintiff could no longer sleep, concentrate, eat, or work. A
plaintiff might also exhibit symptoms such as crying, nightmares,
28. Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923, 923-24 (Tex. 1988) (adopting the
criteria stated in Dillon).
29. See Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. 1986) (noting that decisions al-
lowing recovery for emotional distress, without any proof of physical manifestation, ac-
knowledge that emotional distress is inseparable from certain torts, and as a result, no
physical injury is required); Midkiff v. Shaver, 788 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1990, no writ) (noting that "mental anguish is the emotional distress that typically accom-
panies the tortious act, and it may, though it need not, result in physical injury or physical
manifestations" (citations omitted)).
30. See Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 443 (Tex. 1995) (citing Moore, 722
S.W.2d at 688-92, for the proposition that as claims for mental anguish become more com-
monplace, the court has expressed concern regarding the potential for abuse and over-
compensation); Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem'l Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 368-69 (Tex. 1987)
(noting an award for "shock and emotional trauma" is the same as, and duplicative of,
damages for mental anguish).
31. See Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d at 442 (stating that once the physical impact require-
ment for negligent infliction of emotional distress was diminished, recovery for mental
anguish was allowed only when the anguish was physically apparent); St. Elizabeth Hosp.
v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. 1987) (stating that the sole purpose of the require-
ment of a physical manifestation was to ensure that claims were genuine); Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 241, 54 S.W. 944, 945 (1900) (holding there can be no
recovery for mere fright without an accompanying physical injury).
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and other similar showings of grief. In other words, the body must
physically manifest the emotional suffering32 and there was objec-
tive proof of the alleged mental anguish. Again, two goals were
satisfied: plaintiffs were allowed to recover for their emotional dis-
tress, and a safety measure was in place to guard against the
dreaded false claim. This position proved to be very successful un-
til the medical profession progressed yet again and convinced soci-
ety that not all individuals suffer in the same manner. Namely, not
all injured plaintiffs wear their emotions externally; some are much
more stoic than others.33 In some cases, the plaintiff may manifest
nothing, yet their mental anguish is no less real.
C. Jury Question
To compensate this type of individual, the common law was re-
quired to change yet again. A rule evolved recognizing the role
played by the jury system. In retrospect, the solution was simple:
let the ultimate issue of mental anguish lie within the province of
the jury who would be presented with a question of fact as to
whether the plaintiff's allegations were real.34 The jury system,
which has long been a hallmark of our system of jurisprudence,
32. See Brown & Root, Inc. v. City of Cities Mun. Util. Dist., 721 S.W.2d 881, 884
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (discussing the position taken by a majority
of states whereby proof of a physical injury or a physical manifestation is required before a
claim for emotional distress can be successful); see also Moore, 722 S.W.2d at 684 (noting
that a majority of jurisdictions require a physical manifestation to prevail on a mental
anguish claim).
33. See TrinityUniversal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 826 (Tex. 1997) (stating
that although mental injuries can manifest in a physical manner, it is not automatically
necessary to conclude that claims brought for emotional injuries imply or validate a claim
for overt physical manifestations); Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 860 S.W.2d 893,
899 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1993, writ granted) (noting that courts have construed mental
anguish to justify recovery where a plaintiff's emotional distress results "from a myriad of
negative emotions"), rev'd, 904 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1995); Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831
S.W.2d 81, 88 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ) (Larsen, J., dissenting) (stating "[a] glib
and well-practiced plaintiff is not necessarily more entitled to mental anguish damages
than is a stoic or guileless one").
34. See Gant v. Dumas Glass & Mirror, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 202, 210 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1996, no writ) (opining that a jury's negative answer to the question of mental
anguish was not "against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence" when such
evidence required them to speculate regarding the existence of mental anguish); Arias, 831
S.W.2d at 85 (stating that mental anguish is a non-pecuniary loss, the amount of which is
within the discretion of the jury, and carries "the risks of passion, prejudice, speculation
and bias").
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assumed a position of importance. They, and they alone, would
determine the validity and extent of the plaintiff's claim.
3 5 This po-
sition, which was probably the most advanced and enlightened,
solved many problems. It took into account what the medical pro-
fession was so adept in proving, that not all individuals suffer the
same way.36 The legal profession could now take this fact into con-
sideration and protect against what lawyers have always feared-
false claims. The jury would be in the best position to determine
whether the plaintiff was lying or, in fact, telling the truth.
This rule was in place for some time. It seemed as if the courts
found an effective means of achieving justice. However, as men-
tioned above, the Texas Supreme Court retreated in Boyles v.
Kerr.37
D. Boyles v. Kerr
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Boyles received much at-
tention, and many may recall its salacious facts. A young man in-
vited his lady friend to the family home, and with concealed friends
watching, video-taped the two while engaging in sexual inter-
course. 38 When the truth emerged, the young lady understandably
sued for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.39 This was
her only cause of action, and what is important to this discussion is
the manner in which the court addressed the issue.4°
35. See Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 654 (stating "fj]urors are best suited to determine
whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct caused compensable mental anguish
by referring to their own experience"); see also Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex.
1993) (quoting Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 654, and not overruling the proposition that juries
are the most appropriate forum to determine the applicability of damages for mental
anguish).
36. See Star Houston, Inc. v. Shevack, 886 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (citing Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 752-53 (Tex. 1988),
for the proposition that even with mental anguish injuries, a tortfeasor who causes mental
anguish "takes his plaintiff as he finds him" and regardless of pre-injury susceptibility on
the part of the plaintiff, the injured party can recover for mental anguish).
37. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
38. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993) (indicating Boyles pre-ar-
ranged the video taping).
39. See id. (reporting that Kerr became stigmatized as "porno queen," which affected
her academic performance and future relationships).
40. See id. at 594-95 (narrowing the court's focus on whether Texas recognizes the tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress).
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At the beginning of its opinion, the court stated emphatically:
"Initially, we must determine whether negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress constitutes an independent cause of action."'" The
court discussed the previous position enunciated in St. Elizabeth
Hospital v. Garrard,42 which in effect held that jurors were in the
best position to determine whether and to what extend the defen-
dant's conduct caused compensable mental anguish, and deter-
mined that the case would be overruled;43 but not completely
overruled. The court articulated definite limitations to its new po-
sition by stating: "Therefore, we overrule the language of Garrard
to the extent that it recognizes an independent right to recover for
negligently inflicted emotional distress. Instead, mental anguish
damages should be compensated only in connection with [the] de-
fendant's breach of some other duty imposed by law."'44
Subsequently in their decision, the court added: "By overruling
the language of Garrard, we hold only that there is no general duty
not to negligently inflict emotional distress. Our decision does not
affect a claimant's right to recover mental anguish damages caused
by defendant's breach of some other legal duty."45
The holding is very clear. Whether couched in terms of a para-
sitic recovery in the area of substantive law, or in terms of a re-
quirement in pleading with regard to procedure, the result is the
same-there is no independent recovery for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress in Texas.46 However, and this is the point
being emphasized, this is not the same as holding that the tort no
longer exists. It is recognized, but is compensable only when at-
tached to the breach of some other legal duty.47 It was not the
41. Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
42. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
43. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex. 1987) (holding that
jurors can best determine whether the defendant's conduct was the cause of emotional
distress).
44. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 595-96 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
46. City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. 1997); Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 597;
Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 730, 754 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247,
254 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
47. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 594; Motor Express, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 925 S.W.2d 638, 639
(Tex. 1996); Verinakis v. Med. Profiles, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 90, 94-95 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
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intention of the court to completely abandon the idea of recovery
for negligently inflicted mental anguish.48 This is made clear when
the decision goes on to state: "We ... are not imposing a require-
ment that emotional distress manifest itself physically to be com-
pensable. ' 49  In other words, Texas was not retreating to the
position which followed the impact rule, and was not going to re-
quire a physical manifestation of the plaintiff's alleged mental
anguish. Instead, the presence or absence of this injury would con-
tinue as a question of fact for the jury.
50
Furthermore, the court added that "our holding does not affect
the right of bystanders to recover emotional distress damages suf-
fered as a result of witnessing a serious or fatal accident. Texas has
adopted the bystander rules originally promulgated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg."51 Again, Boyles should not
be considered as a general retreat with regard to the law governing
recovery in the area of negligently inflicted emotional distress. The
court made it quite clear that damages for mental anguish resulting
from the negligent infliction of injury to a third person are still
compensable. 2 Recovery in these instances has been recognized
since the early development of this particular cause of action, and
remains a recognized concept of our common law.53
48. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 598.
49. Id.
50. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex. 1987) (stating that
juries are in the best position to determine compensable mental anguish damages); see also
Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995) (stating a jury finding for
mental anguish damages survives when plaintiffs provide "direct evidence of the nature,
duration, and severity of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in
the plaintiff's daily routine"). The court went on to say that "[s]uch evidence ... is more
likely to provide the fact finder with adequate details to assess mental anguish claims."
Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d at 444.
51. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 597-98.
52. See id. (stating the Dillon v. Legg criteria for bystander liability, and further not-
ing that a bystander must first establish that the primary victim incurred injuries before
being eligible for recovery).
53. See generally Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d at 442-44 (tracing the history of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress); Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 595-600 (evaluating the existence of
an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Texas); Gar-
rard, 730 S.W.2d at 652 (tracing the history of negligent infliction of emotional distress as
supporting justification for elimination of the physical manifestation requirement).
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Boyles is clearly not a complete rejection of Garrard. Instead, it
is a limitation as to the rule enunciated therein. 54 An injured plain-
tiff may not recover for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress alone, but clearly may recover damages for this injury when it
is accompanied by the breach of some other legal duty. From this
discussion, it appears that when plaintiffs sustain injury as a result
of some breach of duty, they may attach a claim for mental
anguish. 6 This is analogous to the above mentioned "impact rule."
Today, however, there is no longer a need for a pre-existing injury.
Instead, all that need be established is a breach of some other legal
duty.
V. CONCLUSION
Boyles has caused far too much confusion. It is time to recognize
that the tort of negligently inflicted emotional distress is alive and
well in Texas. It is clear that the Texas Supreme Court never in-
tended to completely eradicate the cause of action. To recover for
this injury, plaintiffs must only show that they have endured the
breach of some other duty owed to them. As stated above,
whether we think of this in terms of a parasitic recovery in the area
of substantive law, or in terms of a requirement in pleading with
regard to procedure, the result is the same.
54. See Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 597 (asserting that the court's decision does not limit the
right to recover under mental anguish claims, rather recovery is contingent on bringing the
claim along with a breach of another legal duty).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 600. "We agree that certain relationships may give rise to a duty which, if
breached, would support an emotional distress award. However, there must be some spe-
cific duty of care that, under the law, arises from the relationship." Id. (citations omitted).
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